We’ve spent this month looking backward, examining the history we were taught and discovering what was left out. But sometimes, “you don’t know what you don’t know” isn’t about uncovering something that happened generations ago.

Sometimes it’s about recognizing what we don’t understand about the world we’re living in right now.

And sometimes history gives us a way to ask better questions about the future.

Most of us learned a fairly straightforward explanation of the Great Depression. The stock market crashed in October 1929. Investors panicked. Banks failed. People lost their savings, businesses closed, unemployment soared, and families stood in breadlines.

Then Franklin Roosevelt arrived with the New Deal, put people back to work, and helped get the country moving again.

That’s the story, more or less.

And much of it is true, although recovery was considerably more complicated and took much longer than that familiar explanation suggests.

But what if the most important lesson of the Great Depression isn’t simply about what happened when the stock market crashed?

What if it’s about everything that made the crash so devastating?

And what if some of those vulnerabilities look surprisingly familiar today?

The Roaring Twenties Weren’t Roaring for Everybody

We tend to picture the 1920s as a decade of prosperity. Jazz, flappers, automobiles, radios, skyscrapers, and a stock market that seemed to know only one direction.

Up.

For some Americans, it really was a remarkable period of growth. New technologies transformed everyday life. Factories became more productive. Consumer goods that had once been luxuries became available to more households.

And credit helped make that possible.

People bought automobiles, appliances, and other goods through installment plans. Investors purchased stocks using borrowed money, confident that rising prices would allow them to repay their loans and still make a profit.

Prosperity began to feel permanent.

But it wasn’t universal.

Farmers had been struggling through much of the decade. Agricultural prices fell after World War I, leaving many families with debts they could no longer comfortably repay. Wealth and income were distributed unevenly, and many workers had little financial cushion.

The economy looked strong from certain vantage points.

From others, the cracks were already visible.

And nowhere was that more apparent than in parts of the rural South.

South Carolina Was Already Hurting

Here’s something that gets lost when we focus entirely on Wall Street.

South Carolina didn’t have to wait until October 1929 to experience economic disaster.

The state’s cotton economy had been suffering since the beginning of the decade. Overproduction, falling prices, and the destructive boll weevil devastated farms and rural communities.

Between 1920 and 1925, the average value of South Carolina farmland fell from $65 to $43 per acre.

During the 1920s, farmers abandoned one-sixth of the state’s farms. The collapse of the cotton economy contributed to the failure of 49 percent of South Carolina’s banks during the prolonged agricultural and financial crisis of the 1920s and early 1930s.

And the textile industry wasn’t doing much better.

By 1929, shares in the state’s textile mills were selling for approximately half their 1923 value.

Think about that for a moment.

While Americans elsewhere were celebrating an extraordinary economic boom, families in South Carolina were already losing farms, livelihoods, and financial security.

For them, the Great Depression wasn’t the sudden end of a prosperous decade.

It was another devastating blow to an economy that had been struggling for years.

And the suffering deepened. By 1931, cotton prices had fallen below the cost of production. By 1932, property taxes were delinquent on nearly half the state’s farms.

By 1933, approximately one-quarter of South Carolina’s population was eligible for public relief.

That isn’t a story of prosperity suddenly disappearing.

It’s a story of existing hardship becoming something much worse.

And it reminds us that economic crises don’t necessarily begin when the headlines announce them.

Sometimes the damage has been accumulating for years.

The Crash Wasn’t the Whole Catastrophe

On October 24, 1929, the stock market began a dramatic collapse. The panic intensified on October 28 and 29, days remembered as Black Monday and Black Tuesday.

Fortunes disappeared. Investors who had purchased stocks with borrowed money faced enormous losses. Confidence in the financial system was shaken.

But here’s an important distinction.

The stock market crash did not immediately destroy the American banking system.

The worst banking panics came later.

Between 1930 and 1933, thousands of banks suspended operations. Some had made bad loans or invested poorly. Others faced a different problem: frightened depositors demanding their money all at once.

Banks don’t ordinarily keep every deposited dollar sitting in a vault. They use deposits to make loans and finance other assets while maintaining reserves and access to liquidity to meet withdrawals.

That system depends, in part, on confidence.

When depositors believe their money is safe, most leave it in the bank.

When they become convinced the bank might fail, they rush to withdraw it.

And when enough people do that simultaneously, even a bank with valuable assets can run into serious trouble because those assets cannot necessarily be converted into cash quickly enough.

One bank’s difficulties can frighten customers at another.

And another.

And another.

The fear begins to spread.

As banks failed and lending contracted, businesses found it harder to borrow. Businesses reduced production or closed. Workers lost jobs. Families spent less money. Prices fell, making existing debts even harder to repay.

That created more financial trouble for borrowers and lenders alike.

It was a destructive cycle in which each problem made the others worse.

The international gold standard and monetary-policy decisions also constrained the response. The Federal Reserve failed to prevent a devastating contraction in the money supply, allowing banking distress and deflation to reinforce the downturn.

The stock market crash mattered enormously.

But the Great Depression became so severe because multiple weaknesses interacted, and the financial system struggled to contain the damage.

The cracks became a collapse.

You Didn’t Have to Own Stock to Lose Everything

Here’s something about the Great Depression that deserves more attention than it usually receives.

Most Americans weren’t stock market investors in 1929.

They weren’t buying shares on margin, speculating on rising prices, or watching the ticker tape on Wall Street.

They were farming, working in factories, running small businesses, raising children, and trying to pay their bills.

And when the economy collapsed, they suffered anyway.

Think about the South Carolina farmer whose bank failed. Or the textile worker whose mill closed because customers could no longer afford its products.

Neither needed to own a single share of stock to lose a livelihood, a home, or a lifetime of savings.

The consequences of financial speculation and banking distress reached people who had never participated in the speculative boom.

And that raises an uncomfortable question about our economy today.

How much financial risk are we exposed to without ever knowingly agreeing to participate in it?

Today, stock ownership is much more widespread, particularly through retirement accounts and mutual funds. Many Americans are investors without ever having opened a traditional brokerage account.

But even those who own no stocks are connected to financial markets through the institutions they depend upon.

Consider something as ordinary as a mortgage.

You purchase a house, borrow money from a lender, and agree to repay that loan over the next fifteen or thirty years.

Straightforward enough.

Except the institution that made your loan may sell it to another financial institution. That loan may eventually become part of a mortgage-backed security purchased by investors.

Your monthly payment helps support a financial investment that may be bought and sold by people you’ve never met.

And you may have absolutely no idea who ultimately owns your mortgage.

To be clear, selling your mortgage doesn’t mean the new owner can simply rewrite your loan agreement. Your contractual protections remain in place.

Nor is the secondary mortgage market inherently harmful. It helps lenders obtain money to make additional loans and can make mortgage credit more widely available.

But it illustrates something important about the modern economy.

The financial arrangements behind our everyday lives are often far more complicated than they appear.

Your retirement account may hold shares in hundreds of companies. Your employer may depend on borrowed money or investors to finance operations. Your bank may rely on financial markets for funding and liquidity.

Even if you have no investments at all, you still depend on employers, lenders, suppliers, payment systems, and financial institutions that do.

And when those systems experience serious trouble, the consequences can reach people who never participated in the activity that triggered the crisis.

We saw that in the Great Depression.

And we saw it again in 2008.

We Had Another Warning in 2008

In 2008, I was in law school.

I knew there was a financial crisis unfolding. I heard about it, read about it, and understood that something significant was happening.

But between classes, assignments, and everything else demanding my attention, I wasn’t studying the economy.

I was studying law.

And perhaps that’s part of the difficulty with recognizing history while it’s happening.

Most of us are busy living our own lives.

We hear the headlines, recognize that something is wrong, and go back to whatever needs our attention that day.

Only later do we begin to understand how deeply those events were connected to the world around us.

The financial crisis of 2008 is especially important to this conversation because it demonstrated how problems involving ordinary household mortgages could spread throughout the global financial system.

For years, lenders had increasingly offered mortgages to borrowers with weak credit histories, insufficient documentation, or limited ability to repay. Some loans carried terms that became substantially more expensive over time.

Those mortgages were often sold, bundled into securities, and purchased by investors.

Other financial instruments were built around those securities, sometimes creating additional layers of exposure.

The arrangements could be extraordinarily complicated.

And many investors and financial institutions underestimated the risks.

As housing prices rose, the system appeared to be working.

Borrowers could refinance. Lenders could sell loans. Investors could earn returns. Financial institutions could continue expanding their activities.

But when housing prices stopped rising and mortgage defaults increased, the weaknesses became much harder to ignore.

Mortgage-backed securities lost value. Highly leveraged financial institutions faced enormous losses. Credit markets tightened, major firms failed or required extraordinary assistance, and the crisis spread far beyond housing.

Businesses struggled to obtain financing.

Workers lost jobs.

Families lost homes.

Retirement savings declined.

And people who had never purchased a mortgage-backed security suffered the consequences.

Sound familiar?

The 2008 crisis wasn’t a repeat of 1929. Its financial instruments, institutions, and immediate causes were different.

And mortgage securitization itself wasn’t inherently the problem. The danger lay in the combination of weak lending standards, excessive borrowing, misleading assessments of risk, and financial relationships that allowed losses to spread.

But the underlying lesson was familiar.

Risk had become concentrated and interconnected in ways that were not fully understood, and the consequences spread far beyond those who had taken the original risks.

We had learned important lessons from the Great Depression.

We had deposit insurance, banking supervision, central-bank emergency lending, and mechanisms for responding to financial emergencies.

Those protections mattered. They helped prevent a repeat of the widespread depositor losses and banking collapse of the 1930s.

But they hadn’t eliminated financial vulnerability.

Some of the most dangerous risks had developed in institutions and markets that weren’t adequately supervised or understood.

After 2008, additional reforms sought to strengthen bank capital, monitor systemic risks, regulate certain financial activities, and create better procedures for dealing with failing financial institutions.

We learned again.

But the economy kept evolving.

And that brings us to a question I find increasingly difficult to ignore.

Are we keeping up with the systems we’re creating?

When Confidence Disappears

I keep coming back to that word.

Confidence.

It’s an extraordinary thing when you consider how much of our economic life depends upon it.

We deposit money in banks because we trust that it will be there when we need it.

We accept payment from employers because we trust that the money will have value.

We purchase homes, borrow money, invest for retirement, and conduct business based on the assumption that financial institutions will continue functioning tomorrow.

Most of us don’t spend much time examining the machinery behind those assumptions.

Why would we?

It generally works.

Until it doesn’t.

And when confidence disappears, the damage isn’t distributed equally.

People with substantial savings and diversified assets may have options that families living paycheck to paycheck simply don’t.

A delayed paycheck might be an inconvenience for one household and a financial emergency for another.

A lost job might mean postponing a vacation for one family and losing a home for another.

The people least able to absorb a financial shock may be among those most severely affected by it.

That’s part of what makes systemic financial instability so troubling.

The consequences aren’t necessarily confined to the people who made the decisions that created the risk.

And today, confidence depends on more than the financial health of our banks.

It also depends on the technology that allows those banks, businesses, and customers to function.

The Systems We Trust Today

A few days ago, several technology-related disruptions caught my attention.

An air traffic control disruption interrupted travel. United Airlines subsequently experienced a separate technology outage that delayed departing flights.

Then came banking transaction delays involving JPMorgan Chase and transactions with other financial institutions.

At roughly the same time, financial markets were wrestling with uncertainty surrounding artificial intelligence investments and the enormous valuations of companies involved in that industry.

My first reaction was to wonder whether these things were connected.

And it’s important to acknowledge that events happening close together don’t necessarily share a cause.

The reported technology failures have not been established as parts of a coordinated incident. JPMorgan attributed its transaction problems to a software bug, not a cyberattack. United’s disruption was reported as a separate operational problem.

A software failure is not the same thing as a bank becoming insolvent.

And a stock market selloff is not, by itself, evidence of an approaching depression.

But those incidents raised another question for me.

How much of our modern economy depends on systems that most of us don’t understand, cannot see, and have very little ability to influence?

Think about an ordinary day.

You wake up and check your bank balance on your phone.

You pay for coffee with a card.

Your employer sends your paycheck electronically.

You order groceries through an app, make a doctor’s appointment online, or purchase an airline ticket using a digital payment system.

Businesses use interconnected software to manage inventory, process payroll, communicate with suppliers, and move money.

Airlines depend on computer systems for scheduling, maintenance information, and operational coordination.

Financial institutions depend on networks, service providers, and technology platforms to process enormous volumes of transactions.

When everything works, we barely notice.

But what happens when something critical stops working?

When the Money Is There, but You Can’t Reach It

Here’s a distinction that fascinates me.

During the Great Depression, many depositors lost money because banks failed.

Today, a technological disruption can create a different problem.

Your money might still be safely deposited in a financially sound institution.

But what happens if you temporarily cannot access it?

What happens if a payment network stops processing transactions?

If businesses cannot pay suppliers?

If employees cannot receive wages on time?

If customers cannot make purchases?

A short disruption is usually an inconvenience. Institutions have recovery procedures, backup systems, and ways to reconcile delayed transactions.

And an interruption in electronic access doesn’t automatically mean every method of obtaining money has disappeared.

But a prolonged, widespread disruption could create serious economic problems even without the initial failure of a bank.

And if that disruption occurred during a period of financial uncertainty, it could also affect public confidence.

Imagine people already worried about the economy suddenly finding themselves unable to access banking services.

Even if the money remained safe, would everyone believe it?

Would everyone wait patiently for the problem to be resolved?

Or might uncertainty encourage people to move funds, withdraw cash when possible, or lose confidence in institutions that were otherwise financially sound?

That’s not a prediction.

It’s a question about how operational problems might interact with financial fear.

The mechanisms are different from those of the Great Depression. Modern deposit insurance, emergency lending, and financial safeguards change how banking distress can unfold.

But the underlying importance of public confidence remains.

And that deserves our attention.

The AI Question

There’s another modern vulnerability worth examining, and this one has attracted the attention of financial regulators.

Artificial intelligence.

AI is already changing how businesses operate, how people work, and how information is processed.

The potential benefits are enormous.

So are the investments.

Technology companies and their financial partners are spending extraordinary sums building data centers, purchasing advanced computing equipment, securing electricity, and developing the infrastructure needed to support AI systems.

Investors are placing substantial value on expectations of future growth.

And some of that expansion is being financed through complicated borrowing arrangements.

In its November 13, 2026, Financial Stability Report, the Federal Reserve published the results of a survey conducted among 23 financial-market contacts in September and October.

Of those contacts, 87 percent identified AI-related risks among their concerns about financial stability.

That’s roughly twenty people out of twenty-three.

The survey was small, and its participants were financial-market professionals, not a representative sample of the American public.

Their concerns included elevated stock valuations, complex financing arrangements, and cybersecurity threats.

That 87 percent figure doesn’t mean there’s an 87 percent chance of a crisis. Nor does it represent an official prediction by the Federal Reserve.

It tells us that AI-related vulnerabilities were prominent among the concerns of the people surveyed.

And the scale of the investment is substantial.

The Federal Reserve reported that debt issuance associated with advanced computing infrastructure exceeded $680 billion during the first ten months of 2026.

That’s money borrowed to help finance the expansion of advanced computing, including data centers and related infrastructure.

It is not $680 billion in financial losses or defaults.

The financial arrangements supporting that expansion include traditional borrowing, private credit, structured financing, leases, and guarantees.

Some of those relationships are complicated enough that understanding where financial risk ultimately resides can be difficult.

That doesn’t mean AI is a bad investment.

A company can develop genuinely transformative technology and still be overvalued by investors.

An industry can have an extraordinary future while individual investments produce disappointing returns.

And when large amounts of borrowed money are involved, losses can spread beyond the original investors.

If expectations for AI profits fall sharply, investors could sell shares. Companies might reduce spending. Lenders could become more cautious. Businesses depending on continued investment might struggle.

None of those consequences is inevitable.

But the relationships between companies, lenders, investors, and infrastructure providers deserve attention.

Because once again, the important question isn’t simply whether a stock price might fall.

It’s what else might be affected if it does.

And the AI story raises a second concern.

We aren’t simply investing in new technology.

We’re increasingly incorporating that technology into the financial systems we already depend upon.

That creates possibilities for greater efficiency, better fraud detection, and improved financial services.

It also introduces questions about automated decision-making, cybersecurity, and whether increasingly similar computer-driven trading strategies could amplify market movements.

The same technology that may improve financial systems could introduce vulnerabilities that are not yet fully understood.

And that brings us right back to our November theme.

Are We Seeing the Cracks?

This is where I want to be particularly careful.

It would be easy to gather a collection of alarming headlines, compare them to 1929, and announce that another Great Depression is coming.

But that wouldn’t be responsible history.

And it wouldn’t be responsible analysis.

The United States today has financial safeguards that did not exist in 1929. Deposit insurance, central-bank lending facilities, financial supervision, and emergency response mechanisms provide important protections.

The Federal Reserve’s November 2026 report also describes the banking system as sound and resilient overall, even while identifying vulnerabilities that warrant monitoring.

There is no sound basis for concluding that a handful of technology outages and stock market declines mean a new Great Depression is imminent.

But there is equally little reason to assume that modern complexity has eliminated the possibility of a severe crisis.

The risks are different.

Financial institutions are connected to nonbank lenders, investment funds, and global markets. Businesses depend on major technology and infrastructure providers. Digital systems allow enormous volumes of money and information to move almost instantaneously.

That creates remarkable efficiency.

It also creates dependencies.

And dependencies matter most when something goes wrong.

A failure in one system may remain contained.

Or, under the wrong circumstances, it may place pressure on another.

And another.

Not every vulnerability becomes a crisis. Not every disruption spreads. And not every expensive investment turns into a financial disaster.

But history gives us plenty of reasons to examine the connections.

The real question is whether we understand those connections well enough to recognize trouble before it spreads.

And whether the protections we have built are keeping pace with the risks we are creating.

What We Don’t Know

When I began thinking about the Great Depression, I thought I knew the basic story.

Investors speculated. The stock market crashed. Banks failed. People suffered.

And those things happened.

But the more interesting history lies beneath that familiar explanation.

The agricultural communities already struggling before 1929.

The financial arrangements that depended on confidence.

The decisions that allowed banking distress to spread.

The people who suffered even though they had never participated in the speculative boom.

And the safeguards developed afterward to prevent a similar catastrophe.

Then came 2008.

Another crisis. Different financial arrangements. Another reminder that risks can travel through an economy in ways most people never anticipated.

And another round of reforms intended to prevent the next disaster.

Now I look at our own economy and wonder what we’re overlooking.

Not because I believe another Great Depression is around the corner.

I don’t know that.

And neither does anyone else with certainty.

But I do know that we depend on systems of extraordinary complexity. We trust institutions, technologies, and networks that most of us understand only in the broadest terms.

We assume our money will be accessible, our payments will process, our communications will function, and the systems supporting everyday life will continue operating.

Most days, those assumptions are justified.

But history reminds us that prosperity can conceal vulnerability, and confidence can disappear much faster than it was built.

Perhaps the lesson of the Great Depression isn’t simply that we should remember what went wrong in 1929.

Perhaps it’s that we should remain curious about what might go wrong in a world that looks very different.

We’ve learned a great deal in nearly a century.

We’ve built protections our grandparents could scarcely have imagined.

But we’ve also built new systems, created new dependencies, and developed new ways for trouble to travel.

And perhaps the most important thing we don’t know is how much we don’t understand about the things we trust every day.

You don’t know what you don’t know.

But history can teach you where to start asking questions.

Y’all come sit a spell.


Sources and Further Reading

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